

ANTI-SEMITIC PREJUDICE IN CONTEMPORARY
HUNGARIAN SOCIETY
RESEARCH REPORT



BY ENDRE HANN AND DÁNIEL RÓNA

2016.



ACTION AND PROTECTION FOUNDATION

ANTI-SEMITIC PREJUDICE IN CONTEMPORARY
HUNGARIAN SOCIETY
RESEARCH REPORT

BY ENDRE HANN AND DÁNIEL RÓNA

2016.



ACTION AND PROTECTION FOUNDATION

CONTENT



1. Introduction	7
2. The perception and importance of Jewish social issues	8
3. Measuring anti-Semitism and other prejudices	9
4. The extent of anti-Semitism	10
5. Who are the anti-Semites?	18
6. The Holocaust and remembrance of the past	24
7. Israel, the migrant crisis and anti-Semitism	27
8. Associations about the Jews	31
9. The perception of anti-Semitism	34
10. Topical issues	38
11. Comparison	40
12. Summary	42
Appendix	45

ANTI-SEMITIC PREJUDICE IN CONTEMPORARY HUNGARIAN SOCIETY RESEARCH REPORT



1. Introduction¹

In November 2015, Medián Opinion and Research Institute conducted a comprehensive survey commissioned by Action and Protection Foundation. The focus of the survey was on the Hungarian society's relation to the Jewish population, including an examination of issues such as:

- opinions and ideas related to the Jewish people
- a look at how widespread and intense anti-Semitic prejudice is
- public perceptions of anti-Semitism
- opinions of Jews.

The institute issued a questionnaire to 1,200 individuals. Distortions of the sample were corrected through weighted adjustments based on data provided by the Hungarian Central Statistical Institute (Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, KSH). The pool of respondents, all interviewed face-to-face, were representative of the Hungarian population (over age of 18) in terms of sex, age, residence and level of education. The margin of error for the total sample is plus or minus 3 percent, depending on the distribution of responses. The institute conducted the survey based on methodology developed by András Kovács². His questionnaire has been used

in several previous surveys since 1995, allowing the survey commissioners to track changes in data over time.

Respondents were interviewed for a relatively long period of time, approximately half an hour. Before examining the substantial amount of data, it is important to look at how much useful information can be provided by the survey data. On the basis of circumstantial evidence, our report first sheds light on whether opinions, ideas, and recent happenings related to the Jewish people interest the average Hungarian citizen and how relevant they find these. Against this background, our report explores the issue of anti-Semitism and the problems with measuring prejudice. After clarifying the methods, we continue with the presentation of the frequency and prevalence of anti-Jewish views and sentiments, as well as an examination of which social groups are most associated with these attitudes. It is followed by an analysis of data relating to the Holocaust, the remembrance of the past, and perceptions of anti-Semitism. The last section of our report lays out which factors most increase the likelihood of anti-Semitism.

¹ The structure of the report follows that of the 2014 Research Report. Methodological explanations are also taken from the 2014 Research report.

² Kovács András.(2011). *The Stranger at Hand: Anti-Semitic Prejudices in Post-Communist Hungary*. Leiden-Boston: Brill. In Hungarian, Kovács András: *A kéznél lévő idegen. Antiszemita előítéletek a rendszerváltozás utáni Magyarországon*. POLGART Kiadó, Budapest 2005.

2. The perception and importance of Jewish social issues

Similar to last year, it is important to state that issues regarding the Jewish people are not of central interest to Hungarian citizens. However, this is not unexpected as people are concerned by matters that directly affect them.

In 2015, according to content analysis by the National Media and Infocommunications Authority (Nemzeti Média- és Hírközlési Hatóság, NMHH)³, the major Hungarian news channels' 20 most frequently broadcast news items did not include issues related to the Jewish people in any given month. In 2014, it was the debate on the German Occupation Memorial on Szabadság square that received publicity with quantifiable values (yet only for a month, and only medium values), but even this story was abandoned by 2015. In 2014, 61 percent of the respondents said they had heard of the debate, while only 56 percent said the same in 2015. However, the issue itself and the political debate on it are still considered significant in comparison with other cases. For example, only 16 percent of the citizens heard about the Pázmány Péter Catholic University (PPKE)'s new obligatory course on Holocaust education, and only 9 percent of the respondents could actually name the university. (41 percent of those able to name PPKE supported the introduction of the course.)

Statements of self-declaration are not as informative as answers given to open questions (that is, spontaneous answers—without a pre-determined list of answers). The number of individuals who mention a case by themselves is more demonstrative, as only naming a particular case by oneself can be considered as knowing about it. A mere 11 percent of the respondents was able to bring up particular cases. Most of them mentioned the monument on Szabadság square, the election of the new executive rabbi of MAZSIHISZ (Federation of Hungarian Jewish Communities), some Jewish festivals and cultural events, and (presumably the western European) terrorist attacks. Based on these, we concluded that the majority of the respondents only have vague ideas about current Jewish issues. No one talked about Róbert Fröhlich or Zoltán Radnóti, and no one mentioned the issue of the Hóman statue, which received a strong national and international response.

On this basis, it can be assumed that the issues central to our report—engagement (social distance, prejudice, and attitudes) with Jewish issues—is not at the top of an average Hungarian citizen's priorities. In what follows, all data should be examined in the context that possibly only a small and insignificant percentage of the respondents consider the topic of our questionnaire relevant.

³ http://mediatanacs.hu/tart/index/1004/Politikusok_partok_a_hirmusorokban

3. Measuring anti-Semitism and other prejudices

It also follows that, for example, the question of “*To what extent do you like or dislike the Jews?*” can only indicate the direction of the attitudes, not the weight attributed to the question. It is debatable, even in cases of extreme sympathy or antipathy, whether there are underlying emotions and motivations of higher significance. It is also important to highlight that the survey can reveal opinions, prejudices, and attitudes, but not behaviors.

Our interpretation of the research is that the questions used to gauge anti-Semitism primarily explore attitude, that is, a manifestation that can be characterized as volatility. It is worth comparing over time whether the climate of opinion has become more empathetic or hostile towards the Jewish population. During the examination, following the methodology used by András Kovács,

two dimensions are distinguished. Cognitive anti-Semitism refers to the concurrence with stereotypes, fallacies, and conspiracy theories in connection with Jews, whereas general emotional rejection and social distancing are designated as affective anti-Semitism. The ratio of respondents characterized by both attitudes, and also to what extent they can be characterized, is provided by aggregating the two dimensions. Those agreeing with very few anti-Semitic statements are categorized as “*not anti-Semitic*”. People agreeing with a few but not insignificant number of statements are “*moderately anti-Semitic*”. “*Strongly anti-Semitic*” are those who agree with the majority of the statements. Again, we should emphasize that these categories do not indicate the importance attributed to the issue relative to other issues, neither do they say anything about the actions of the respondent.

4. The extent of anti-Semitism

Cognitive anti-Semitism

The content of anti-Semitic prejudice was measured by a series of questions that had been used several times over the last two decades to conduct surveys gauging concepts and “knowledge” about the Jewish people. Respondents were asked to indicate on a five-point scale how much they agreed with eight statements. The statements expressed

traditional anti-Jewish sentiments of religious origins (anti-Judaism), anti-Jewish stereotypes based on perceptions of excessive influence by Jews in society, or suggestions regarding the oppression of Jews as solution. Table 1 shows the percentage of the respondents who fully or rather agree (values 5 and 4) with the statements.

Table 1 *The content of anti-Jewish prejudice (percent of respondents who agree with the statements)*

	year	fully agree	agree
Intellectuals of Jewish origin keep media and culture under their influence. ⁴	2006	12	19
	2011	14	21
	2013	11	18
	2014	11	16
	2015	14	19
There is a secret Jewish conspiracy that determines political and economic processes.	2006	10	17
	2011	14	20
	2013	15	19
	2014	14	17
	2015	15	20
Jewish influence is too great in Hungary today.	2013	12	15
	2014	9	15
	2015	15	17
It would be best if the Jews emigrated from the country.	2006	5	7
	2011	8	12
	2013	6	9
	2014	6	14
	2015	9	11
The number of Jews in certain fields of employment should be restricted.	2006	5	10
	2011	7	12
	2013	5	11
	2014	7	9
	2015	8	13
The crucifixion of Jesus is the unpardonable sin of the Jews.	2006	8	12
	2011	9	12
	2013	7	8
	2014	9	16
	2015	10	15
The sufferings of the Jews were God’s punishment.	2006	7	7
	2011	5	9
	2013	4	7
	2014	7	10
	2015	7	11
The Jews are more prone to using unethical means to achieve their goals than others.	2006	8	13
	2011	9	17
	2013	7	15
	2014	7	13
	2015	11	15

⁴ In order to avoid any confusion, the statement in the 2015 questionnaire was “It presents a threat that intellectuals of Jewish origin keep media and culture under their influence”.


At least 20 and at most 35 percent of the respondents agreed with each of the statements. The first three statements, concerning the Jews' "excessive" and "threatening" influence, were the most popular. This may be linked to the fact that one in five respondents was even in agreement with the statement recalling the spirit of the numerus clausus principle (limiting the number of students who may attend a university).

The percentage of the respondents who agreed to the first three statements concerning influence is significantly higher than last year's and previous years' results. The percent of people who would like to restrict the number of Jews, and of those who believe that the Jews are more prone to use unethical means to achieve their goals are also at their peaks. (However, these two categories only reflect a significant increase when compared to 2014, but not to 2011.) With regards to other questions, the overall picture has not changed much, yet there were no answers that reflected a decrease in anti-Semitism.

slightly but delectably increased in Hungary, as seen in Graph 1. The three categories were established by the following analysis: respondents were given an overall score based on their responses to each of the eight questions, and they were divided into three groups based on the degree to which their answers reflected agreement or rejection of statements measuring prejudiced stereotyping. The lowest grade point was 8, and the highest was 40. Members of the first group (not anti-Semitic) might have some prejudice towards Jews or beliefs in particular stereotypes, but overall, they rated relatively low on the scale (8–20 points). The second group (moderately anti-Semitic) includes those described as semi-prejudiced (21–30 points). Individuals in the third group are viewed as extreme anti-Semites on the basis of their score (30–40 points). Respondents answering "do not know" or refusing to answer were "unclassifiable". This fourth group displays a significant decrease (from 36 to 23 percent) in 2015. For reasons of clarity, however, only the ratio of the respondents who did not refuse to answer is indicated.

Based on the difference in temporal trend, it can be established that cognitive anti-Semitism has

Graph 1 Percent of cognitive anti-Semites in the Hungarian society in 2013, 2014 and 2015



With regards to cognitive anti-Semitism, Graph 1 shows that the number of not anti-Semitic respondents has somewhat decreased, and the number of extreme anti-Semites has increased in the last two years. Few percent differences do not lead to far-reaching conclusions, yet if we look at the ratios, the change in the extreme anti-Semitic category is significant.

made based on group classification. The most significant exceptions are the 10 percent of the not anti-Semites who believe there is a secret Jewish conspiracy, and the “mere” 69 percent of the extreme anti-Semites who agree with the last anti-Jewish statement. However, in general, the eight claims show very similar patterns within groups distinguished by their degree of anti-Semitism.

Table 2 illustrates that in the majority of the cases, predictions regarding responses can be

Table 2 *The content of anti-Jewish prejudice (percent of respondents who agree with the statements)*


	<i>extremely anti-Semitic</i>	<i>moderately anti-Semitic</i>	<i>not anti-Semitic</i>
It presents a threat that intellectuals of Jewish origin keep media and culture under their influence	91	44	2
There is a secret Jewish conspiracy that determines political and economic processes	83	46	10
Jewish influence is too great in Hungary today	93	45	5
The Jews are more prone to using unethical means to achieve their goals than others	88	37	2
It would be best if the Jews emigrated from the country	82	24	1
The number of Jews in certain fields of employment should be restricted	80	27	1
The crucifixion of Jesus is the unpardonable sin of the Jews	86	29	5
The sufferings of the Jews were God's punishment	69	20	4

Affective Anti-Semitism

In this dimension, the sentiments in connection with the Jewish population are explored through

three questions. Firstly, respondents were asked if they feel sympathy or antipathy towards the Jews.

Graph 2 *Emotional rejection of the Jews, 2013-2015 (percentage of respondents agreeing)*



It is conspicuous that a significant and visible increase in the proportion of those who expressed anti-Jewish emotions occurred between 2009 and 2010—a change that seems to be permanent. As opposed to 10 percent in 2009, the percent has been over 20 percent since 2010. Although election years typically foster higher degrees of anti-Semitism, the surge of 2010 cannot be only explained by the fact that it was an election year. One reasonable assumption is to draw a connection between higher levels of anti-Semitism and the rocketing popularity of the Jobbik party and its acceptance by many into the political mainstream. Jobbik’s rise helped legitimize public discourse that included increased criticism of Jews. Although the percent in 2015 was lower than 2010’s peak, the ratios of the last two years have again been on the rise.

The second question is very similar to the first one, but instead of two options, the interviewees were

requested to indicate their sentiments regarding Jews and other ethnic groups with the help of a nine-point scale. Nine marked the strongest sympathy, 1 marked the strongest antipathy. The average points of responses are shown in Table 3.

Table 3 indicates a tendency that differs from that of Graph 2. Sympathy towards the Jews has increased, but only to a 5 on the scale (the median value of the scale). In general, respondents did not find ethnic groups living in the country likable. On the other hand, the perception of the Jews is considered relatively good compared to the sentiments towards other groups, only the Swabians scored higher than the Jewish people. The Gypsies have always been the most disapproved of ethnic group by Hungarian society. However, 2015 saw the appearance of a new and even less likable group: the migrants.

Table 3 *Sympathy barometer of the Jews and other ethnic groups on a scale of 9*

	2006	2007	2009	2010	2011	2013	2014	2015	Correlation coefficient* with sympathy towards Jews
arabok	3,87	3,66	4,37	4,04	3,93	4,06	4,09	3,32	0,360**
cigányok	3,33	3,03	3,39	3,64	3,63	3,69	3,64	3,29	0,286**
négerek	4,55	4,24	4,72	4,26	4,48	4,20	4,28	3,96	0,455**
románok	4,70	4,00	4,11	4,23	4,44	4,26	4,45	4,41	0,497**
kínaiak	3,77	3,80	4,09	4,01	4,11	4,12	4,33	4,44	0,422**
svábok	5,38	5,48	5,75	4,86	5,14	4,96	5,30	5,79	0,558**
zsidók	5,02	5,00	5,24	4,47	4,61	4,53	4,73	5,09	-
migránsok	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,84	0,353**

*Correlation coefficient is a statistical indicator that expresses the closeness of the relationship between two variables. The value equals 1 if one of the variables is completely defined by the other valuable, 0 if they are completely independent from each other. So, for example, a correlation coefficient of 0.558 between the perception of the Jews and the Swabians means that there is a strong relationship between the two sympathy scales: largely the same respondents like (and dislike) the two ethnic groups. The other relationships are weaker, but still significant (at a 95 percent confidence level, which is indicated by two stars).

The prevailing anti-migrant climate of opinion is also indicated by the fact that ethnic groups that could be associated with migrants—Arabs and

Africans—scored significantly lower in 2015, the perception of these two ethnic groups are at an all time low⁵. As for change over time, again, the

5 For details please see Median’s September research: <http://median.hu/object.c38fa2c9-5bc2-40c9-ac38-bab515a5f172.ivy>


most significant difference was between 2009 and 2010, in the case of nearly all ethnic groups. The Jews reached a score very close to the initial level (again, only the two ethnic groups associated with migrants scored significantly lower than before).

The last column of Table 3 also indicates that anti-Semitism is likely accompanied by antipathy for all other groups. The correlation is particularly strong between the sympathy scale of the Jews and that of the Romanians, the Swabians, the Chinese and

the Africans. Yet the correlation is still significant when comparing the Jews with all the other ethnic groups. This means that mostly the same respondents dislike the Jews, the Swabians and the other ethnic groups (see the note below Table 3). Thus, anti-Semitism often goes hand-in-hand with general xenophobia.

The third question was again to measure rejection of and social distance from the Jews, and other ethnic groups or minorities.

Graph 3 Social distance from different ethnic groups “Would not consent to a member of the group moving into the neighborhood” (percentage)(százalék)



The results once again demonstrate a high level of rejection of “otherness” in Hungary: one-third to one-fifth of the society is dismissive toward even the most tolerated group. Antipathy for the Jews in

Hungarian society is not particularly strong relative to antipathy shown towards all minority groups. Graph 3 also confirms the poor public perception of migrants. In addition, Table 3 and Graph 3 show

a strong influence of migrants on the perception and scores of other ethnic groups. Context always affects the results of a questionnaire; the appearance of migrants on the questionnaire—and the fact that many associate the Arabs and the Africans with migrants—resulted in a less dismissive attitude towards other ethnic groups. Except for the Gypsies and Skinheads, the perception of other ethnic groups, including the Jews, became less critical in 2015. It is probable that respondents thought of them in comparison with the migrants. This was also confirmed when respondents were questioned about the Jews (Graph 2, “*Feeling antipathy towards the Jews*”), the results did not show significant improvements, but a slight decline.

Answers to the question about having different ethnic groups in one’s neighborhood illustrate that anti-Semitism is usually the manifestation of a broader xenophobia. Those respondents who are

reluctant to live next door to the ethnic minorities in question, are more dismissive about the Jews as well (Table 4). This general xenophobia applies to everyone who is “*different*”. For example, intuitively, it might be assumed that completely different groups reject the Jews and skinheads, but in fact, on the contrary, those who reject skinheads are more likely to reject the Jews, too. For the significant majority of the Hungarian population, “*Jewish*” is merely one of many manifestations of different. Therefore, the negative sentiments and antipathy towards them are not different from those towards everybody who embodies “*being different*”. Table 4 shows how closely related the perceptions (sympathy and antipathy) towards the Jews and other ethnic groups are. Respondents who would consent to live next door to ethnic minorities, are not dismissive about the Jews (first column). Those respondents who are dismissive about ethnic minorities, are more likely to feel antipathy towards the Jews, too (second column).

Table 4 *Would consent to Jewish neighbors (percent)*

	<i>Would consent to ... neighbors</i>	<i>Would NOT consent to ... neighbors</i>
African	93	50
Migrant	93	59
Arab	90	58
Homosexual	90	50
Roman	89	44
Gypsy	88	58
Chinese	87	46
Swabian	83	11
American	82	25
Skinhead	82	62

Analysis of the first three data sets—applying our usual research method—and the aggregation of the results of Graphs 2 and 3 give an overall view of


the percent of the Hungarian population that have anti-Semitic feelings⁶. Graph 4 again shows that affective anti-Semitism was the strongest in 2010,

⁶ Those respondents who feel antipathy towards the Jews and marked a score between 1 and 5 on the sympathy barometer were listed among the extreme anti-Semites. Other members of the group feeling antipathy, and those who did not feel antipathy for the Jews, but marked a value between 1 and 3 on the sympathy barometer, were categorized as moderate anti-Semites. All the rest were categorized as not anti-Semitic.

and has weakened slightly since then. Compared to the previous year, 2015 demonstrates a significant decrease in the ratio of moderate anti-Semites, but the numbers of both not anti-Semites and strongly anti-Semites increased. Since the number of strongly anti-Semites only increased by one percentage point, the overall picture shows a slight

improvement. (However, this may be linked to the influence of the question concerning migrants and its influence on the context of the questionnaire.) It seems, all in all, approximately one-third of the population reflect attitudes consistent with affective anti-Semitism.

Graph 4 Percentage of affective anti-Semites, 2003-2015



We also analyzed how consistent responses to the first three questions in the affective dimension (Graphs 2 and 3, Table 3) were. We considered a respondent consistent if he or she responded the same way (either anti-Semitic or not anti-Semitic) to all three questions⁷. Based on this, 70 percent of the respondents were consistent, 23 percent were inconsistent. Inconsistent respondents gave anti-Semitic answers to one question, and not anti-Semitic answers to another. 7 percent of

the respondents answered “do not know”. This categorization, first of all, makes the aggregation of questions into one dimension justified. Moreover, it also sheds light on the fact that a majority of the respondents took the questions with uncertainty, they could not really relate to them. Most of the respondents had no previously-formed opinions so it is likely they had not thought about the issues asked in the questionnaire before.


⁷ Those respondents who feel antipathy towards the Jews (Graph 2), who would not move into their neighborhood (Graph 3), and who marked a score between 1 and 4 on the sympathy barometer (Table 3) were listed as anti-Semitic. Respondents with exactly the opposite answers were also considered consistent. The medium value of Table 3 is thought to be reconcilable and consistent with all other answers.

Ratio of anti-Semites based on the aggregation of the two dimensions

People with anti-Semitic thinking and those with anti-Semitic feelings—though presumably largely overlapping—are not identical. In the next part of our analysis, the two dimensions are aggregated. People who are characterized by vigorous anti-Semitism in both dimensions, or characterized by extreme anti-Semitism in one dimension and moderate anti-Semitism in the other dimension are considered extreme anti-Semitic. Moderate anti-Semites are the ones who are moderate in both dimensions, or are extreme in one and not anti-Semitic in the other.

Accordingly, we can see that one-third of the society can be categorized as anti-Semitic, one-fifth as strongly anti-Jewish. The temporal trend is similar to that of the sub-components: from 2006 to 2011 there was a significant increase, since then a slight decrease in anti-Semitism. 2015 saw a slight increase again. This aggregated index will be applied hereinafter in this study.

Graph 5 *The proportion of anti-Semites in Hungarian society, 2006-2015 (percent)*




5. Who are the anti-Semites?

Prejudice in the light of demographic, economic and social status

It is important to set out that there is only a weak link between anti-Semitism and social environment. Anti-Jewish sentiments emerge in all social groups; there are no significant differences between different social groups. Consistent with previous results, men are more prone to anti-Semitism than women. The middle-aged generation (40-49 years old) is found to be the most anti-Semitic among all groups, similarly to 2014, but the difference between the groups was smaller last year. Data from 2014 showed that people living in Budapest had the highest susceptibility to anti-Semitism. Based on data from 2015 and years previous to 2014, it would seem that this was only an “*odd*” finding

due to the contingency of the sampling. According to data from 2015, people living in small towns are more prone to anti-Semitic prejudices. It is a popular belief that anti-Semitism is mostly found in unsuccessful, marginalized individuals living under existential threat. This is not supported by any of our data. There is no significant correlation between level of education, social status, type of work (physical or intellectual) and anti-Jewish sentiments. The results of nearly all groups as regards income, social status, and level of education are the same. Only college graduates have a slightly lower susceptibility to anti-Semitism than others.

Graph 6 *Anti-Semitism and demographic, economic, and social status*




Anti-Semitism and religiousness

Respondents were asked numerous questions about religious beliefs and religiousness. We examined if religiousness, the regularity of religious practice, and membership to a congregation are linked to anti-Jewish prejudice. There were no substantive differences in this dimension either. The degree of anti-Semitism is not related to a particular religious belief or the level of religiousness. The differences demonstrated by Graph 7 are so minimal that no

conclusions can be made with any of the groups. Even anti-Jewish sentiments of religious origins—anti-Judaism—showed no significant correlation with religiosity. If it was important to highlight a specific aspect, we would draw attention to an exception: among baptized Protestants, there were slightly more anti-Semites—similar to last year—but because of the small sample, there is significant statistical uncertainty in this context.

Graph 7 *Anti-Semitism and religiousness*




Anti-Semitism and social attitudes

Whether a correlation can be established between anti-Semitism and political preferences is at least as relevant as whether anti-Semitism is related to social status. Political preferences were first examined through the analysis of opinions on sociopolitical issues.

Research conducted in 2015 and previous years show that anti-Jewish prejudice is closely linked to various world views and social attitudes that are not directly related to the Jews, such as nationalism, Euro-skepticism, the rejection of otherness (xenophobia), a conservative world view, and faith in certain moral and social norms and rules. Condemning homosexuality and abortion, and

opposing to EU membership correlates to anti-Semitism. Those who believe in law and order—who are in favor of the death penalty, who would imprison drug abusers—are also more prone to anti-Jewish sentiments. On the other hand, there is no significant correlation between anti-Semitism and statements expressing a pessimistic view of society (*“in this country only unethical people can become rich”* and *“the country’s leader do not really care about people like you”*). This is somewhat surprising because previous research results have shown that the feelings of neglect can be a source of anti-Semitism. The same tendencies were reflected in research conducted in 2014.

Graph 8 Anti-Semitism and social attitudes (percentage)



Anti-Semitism and political choice

This section explores whether political beliefs, interest in politics, and party preference are correlated to levels of anti-Semitism. We based response on a 7-point scale (left-right wing, conservative-liberal, moderate-radical dimensions) and on three questions. Political attitudes are more closely connected to anti-Semitic attitudes than demographic characteristics, but are still only weakly related to anti-Semitism. Anti-Semites, on average, categorize themselves as more right-

wing (from 4, the arithmetic mean value), even more to as radical right-wing, and only minimally to conservative directions compared to the larger population. However, due to the unpopularity of left-wing parties, the whole society has become a bit more right-wing. At the same time, it was outlined quite clearly that on the basis of average points, many leftist, liberals, and moderate respondents agreed with anti-Semitic statements.


Table 5 *Anti-Semitism and interest in politics, 2015 (average points on a 7-point scale)*

	<i>total population</i>	<i>extremely anti-Semitic</i>	<i>moderately anti-Semitic</i>	<i>not anti-Semitic</i>
left-wing (1)–right-wing (7)	4,65	5,25	4,97	4,37
conservative (1)–liberal (7)	3,65	3,27	3,72	3,77
moderate (1)–radical (7)	3,38	4,97	3,78	3,04

Interest in politics has a weak correlation with anti-Semitism. Groups with the most interest in politics have much more anti-Jewish responses. However, those with no interest in politics show an average level of anti-Semitism (Graph 9).

This relationship perhaps also means that the anti-Jewish voters are more vocal and prone to public advocacy, thus their number is overestimated by public opinion.

Graph 9 *Anti-Semitism and interest in politics (percentage)*




There is a stronger statistical relationship between party preference and anti-Semitism (Graph 10). 40 percent of the respondents who support Jobbik are strongly anti-Semitic, and another 20 percent are moderately anti-Semitic. Support for Jobbik had the highest correlation with anti-Semitic attitudes among all variables. In 2014, on the other hand, an absolute majority of the respondents that supported Jobbik were strongly anti-Semitic, the percentage therefore slightly decreased (which might be due to Jobbik's efforts and strategies to be regarded as a people's party). The ratio of anti-Semitism has become slightly higher among supporters of the current Fidesz-led government since 2014, but this value is still only slightly higher than the average value of Hungarian citizens over 18 years of age. As results concerning migration in research conducted by Median have shown⁸, socialists (and uncertain voters) have a level of anti-

Semitism close to the average, they are between the levels of right and left-wing parties. The number of DK and LMP supporters agreeing with anti-Jewish statements is below average. Among supporters of small, left-wing parties (Munkáspárt, MOMA, Együtt, PM, Liberálisok), there are hardly any anti-Semitic respondents. (Yet because of the small sample, there is significant statistical uncertainty in this context.)

Regardless, the mistake of considering anti-Semitism to be a characteristic of only certain political parties is refuted by the data. One-fifth of the socialist respondents and one-third of Fidesz supporters are, while 4 out of 10 Jobbik supporters are not anti-Semitic. As 14 percent of the total sample is made up of Jobbik supporters, there is no clear correlation that shows that the majority of those with anti-Semitic attitudes support Jobbik.

Graph 10 *Anti-Semitism and party choices (percentage)*



8 <http://median.hu/object.c38fa2c9-5bc2-40c9-ae38-bab515a5f172.ivy>

6. *The Holocaust and remembrance of the past*

In Hungary, Holocaust remembrance is an important issue for both proponents of anti-Semitism and the Jewish people, leading to many conflicts due to different viewpoints. This is why the questionnaire—again allowing the analysis of temporal trend—also contained a series of

questions aimed at examining the Hungarian population’s view on the Holocaust, on Hungary’s complicity in the persecution of the Jews during World War II, as well as on the need to come to terms with this history.


Table 6 *Opinions about the Holocaust, responsibility and facing the past, 2009-2015 (percentage, positive statements in connection with the Jews in italics)*

	<i>agree</i>					
	2006	2009	2011	2013	2014	2015
1. Non-Jewish Hungarians suffered as much during the War as Jews	56	66	65	65	60	64
2. There weren't gas chambers in the concentration camps	7	6	7	8	12	11
3. The number of Jewish victims was much lower than what is usually claimed	14	12	18	19	23	23
4. <i>More should be taught about Jewish persecution in schools so it can never happen again</i>	45	54	46	50	42	46
5. A large part of the horrors were invented by the Jews after the event	9	11	13	14	15	19
6. After so many years, the subject of the persecution of the Jews ought to be taken off the agenda	48	40	58	53	54	50

The distribution of the responses to how necessary it is to talk about the Jewish persecution is mixed. Statement 4 reflects more should be taught about it, while statement 6 expresses the opposite, but both statements were supported by approximately half of the respondents. Although the vast majority of the respondents do not relativize the Holocaust or deny it occurred, a significant percentage do so: 10 percent of the respondents expressed complete denial, 20-25 percent partially denied the Holocaust or relativized it. These rates have also increased in recent years (Graph 11). It is difficult to

determine whether there is a general paranoia and an increasing susceptibility to conspiracy theories behind the numbers, or simply just Holocaust denial. The distribution of the responses to other statements did not change significantly between 2006 and 2015. Compared to 2014, responses exhibit an improvement of attitude towards how much talk there should be about the Holocaust, but a slight deterioration of attitude concerning Holocaust denial. However, compared to 2006, Holocaust denial has become significantly more prevalent.

Graph 11 Percentage of respondents agreeing with statements denying or relativizing the Holocaust, 2006-2015



The results are somewhat surprising if we analyze the correlation between the responses to questions related to the Holocaust and the categories of anti-Semitism (Table 7). We would expect that not anti-Semites unanimously support positive statements referring to the Jews, while negative expressions are backed by the extreme anti-Semites. However, our data contradict, or at least question both presumptions. Of course, anti-Semitic respondents, particularly those with strong anti-Jewish sentiments are far less empathetic to the Jews than non anti-Semites. However, 10 percent of not anti-Semitic respondents agreed to statements denying or relativizing the Holocaust, but even more surprisingly, one-third of the

strongly anti-Semites thought that there should be more talk about and more classes devoted to teaching about the persecution of Jews. This phenomenon suggests that a lot of the respondents were confused about the issues and have no clear opinions regarding the hidden dilemmas of these issues. In any case, it seems clear that attitudes which reflect a reluctance to facing the past are only partially related to anti-Semitism. As set out in the report of 2013 by András Kovács, “[it] is not correct to assume a direct relationship between anti-Semitism and the reluctance to face the history: the former is not necessarily the cause of the latter, and the latter does not necessarily come from aspirations of legitimizing anti-Semitism”.

Table 7 *Opinions about Israel and anti-Semitism, 2015 (The percent of those in agreement; positive statements in connection with the Jews are in italics)*

	<i>extremely anti-Semitic</i>	<i>moderately anti-Semitic</i>	<i>not anti-Semitic</i>
1. Non-Jewish Hungarians suffered as much during the War as Jews	83	68	59
2. There weren't gas chambers in the concentration camps	24	9	10
3. The number of Jewish victims was much lower than what is usually claimed	55	33	17
<i>4. More should be taught about Jewish persecution in schools so it can never happen again</i>	29	39	59
5. A large part of the horrors were invented by the Jews after the event	46	26	12
6. After so many years, the subject of the persecution of the Jews ought to be taken off the agenda	72	61	42

7. Israel, the migrant crisis and anti-Semitism

Firstly, respondents were asked open questions (questions without a range of pre-determined answers) in order to find out what they associated Israel with. There were as many types of responses as many respondents, the results were categorized

and are shown in Table 8. Similar answers were classified in the same category. 21 percent of the respondents did not answer the question, Table 8 does not contain data about them.

Table 8 “What comes to your mind when you hear the word ‘Israel?’” (open question, percent of mentions)

Type and classification of answers, most frequent mentions	not anti-Semitic	moderately anti-Semitic	extremely anti-Semitic	Jobbik supporters	Total sample
Descriptive, neutral: country of the Jews, country, state, religion, Middle-East, Arabs, language	50	36	48	37	47
Negative, but unknown whether they blame the Arabs or the Jews: war, terrorism, explosions, fear, tension	33	35	30	36	34
Famous attributes, mainly positive: Jesus, Jerusalem, the Western Wall, Nazareth, the Bible, synagogue, beautiful country	10	21	11	12	11
Negative on Israel: Fanatic, aggressive, aggressive murderer, evil, unlawful, disgust, tyrant	3	4	7	9	4
Money, wealth, power, influence	2	4	4	4	3
World War II, the Holocaust	2	0	0	2	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100

The majority, 47 percent of the answers were neutral and descriptive with no emotional components. 34 percent of the respondents thought of the war in the Middle-East, terrorism and terrorist attacks, yet it was not clear whether they blamed the Jews or the Arabs in the answers. Approximately one in ten respondents mentioned a famous sight, that is, something positive rather than negative. Only 4 percent of the respondents made prejudiced remarks, yet it is important to mention that 3 percent of the people belonging to the last category (mentioning “money”, “wealth”, “influence”) were driven by envy and not appreciation. Surprisingly, examining the correlation with anti-Semitism, it seems that only the especially prejudiced and contemptuous answers were systematically

more common among anti-Semites and Jobbik supporters. It was also unexpected that mentioning famous sights and Biblical references, and bringing up terrorism and the war were both just as common among anti-Semites and Jobbik supporters as among other respondents. It appears likely, therefore, that the majority of the respondents considered anti-Semites by our system do not necessarily associate Israel—and the Jews, as presented in Chapter 8—with negatives. On the other hand, if they are reminded anti-Semitic and anti-Israel aspects, they are more prone to agree with them than others. Consequently, anti-Semitism and anti-Israelism appear to be a susceptibility rather than a constant state of mind.

Reactions to, agreements and rejections of theories and discussions relating to Israel are added to our associative mapping. Criticism of Israeli politics does not necessarily mean that someone has negative attitudes towards the Jewish people living in Hungary (and vice versa). However, anti-Semitism is commonly disguised as criticism of the Jewish state. To explain its anti-Jewish stances (including Gyöngyösi’s infamous “*listing speech*”), Jobbik always goes back⁹ to Simon Perez’s statement¹⁰ about Israeli investors intending to buy out Hungary. Jobbik uses this speech—delivered

with smile, intended as a joke, as a way to spread fear through its propaganda machine. Fear caused by Jobbik’s blatant misrepresentation of Perez’s joke is often cited during discussions of popular conspiracy theory held by Jobbik and many of its supporters regarding Israeli international machinations. As the topic was a feature of Hungarian public discourse long before the appearance of the far-right Jobbik party, it is reasonable to include this question into the questionnaire and to note responses from Jobbik supporters separately (Table 9).

Table 9 *Opinions about Israel and anti-Semitism, 2015* (Percent of those in agreement among respondents (percent; 5 – agrees fully, 1 – does not agree at all; those in agreement = 5 and 4. In the Total population column, the figures in brackets are data from 2014)

	<i>not anti-Semitic</i>	<i>moderately anti-Semitic</i>	<i>extremely anti-Semitic</i>	<i>Jobbik supporters</i>	<i>Total population</i>
Jews living here are more loyal to Israel than to this country	18	52	64	55	27 (26)
Jews in Hungary would rather support Israel at a Hungarian-Israeli match than Hungarians	19	68	44	40	29
Israel is fighting a defensive battle against attacks launched against it	28	33	32	26	25 (22)
The political system of Israel is more progressive than that of the Arab countries attacking it	35	32	32	23	27 (26)
I am more understanding with Israel seeing the more severe terror attacks at it than I used to be	25	22	43	15	23
Israel is an aggressor, it commits genocide against the Palestinians	20	34	63	40	28

The high number (15-20 percent) of “*do not know*” responses clearly indicates that the majority of the population is not familiar with the subject matter and find it rather distant. The first two questions mean basically the same, only they are worded differently—but still, one-fifth of the respondents

gave opposite answers to them, and 13 percent of the respondents answered “*do not know*” to both questions. A mere 44 percent of the respondents were consistent in their answers, and another 24 percent were broadly consistent¹¹.

9 For example, <http://www.sokkaljobb.hu/content/jobbik-perez-megh%C3%ADv%C3%A1sa-s%C3%A9rt%C3%A9s-az-eg%C3%A9sz-magyars%C3%A1gra-n%C3%A9zve>

10 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UPHCiGL6r-M>

11 Based on the two 5-scale questions, respondents were considered consistent if they marked the same scores for both questions. Those who had a one-score difference in their answers were listed as broadly consistent.

This also shows that a majority of the respondents are not familiar with and are uncertain about the issue.

Overall, the population disagrees with the statements. It seems that the first and last statements were the clearest. This is what the anti-Semitic responses indicate. Mainly anti-Semites and Jobbik supporters think that Hungarian Jews are more loyal to Israel and that Israel is an aggressor. Agreement with the statement *“The political system of Israel is more progressive than that of the Arab countries attacking it”* is not at all in connection with the general perception of the Jews. It is probable that a number of respondents were uncertain about the statement (perhaps the phrase *“more progressive”* was not well-understood by some respondents). Agreement with the legitimacy of Israeli’s self-defense shows an interesting distribution: Hungarians are a bit more understanding with Israel than they were in 2014

(compared to last year’s 22 percent, 25 percent of the respondents agreed with the legitimacy of Israeli’s self-defense in 2015). It is likely that antipathy is now felt towards the Arab countries due to the migrant waves. It is highly unexpected that extreme anti-Semites were the most understanding with the Jewish state. However, since they feel the most antipathy towards migrants and the Arabs, the change is more easily understood. It is again shown that the perception of the Jews and Israel has only improved in the change of context, with the appearance of migrants. The only reason for the improvement is the antipathy felt towards the Arabs and the Muslims who are associated with the migrants, since general sympathy towards the Jews decreased. However, antipathy towards the migrants would not always lead to being understanding with the Jews or Israel, it may indeed be linked to anti-Semitism in certain contexts (Table 10).

Table 10 *Relation between anti-Semitism and the opinions about the migrant crisis (proportion of those in agreement, percentage)*

	<i>anti-Semites</i>	<i>not anti-Semites</i>
The word <i>“fear”</i> brings <i>“terror”, “war”, “migrant”, “immigrant”, “Muslim”</i> to a head (open question)	39	28
<i>“Certain individuals and interest groups organize and support migration, and this plays a role in the sharp rise of the number of refugees going to Europe”</i>	49	40
the USA is behind the migrant crisis (open question)	18	12
George Soros is behind the migrant crisis (open question)	11	5
Israel and the Jews are behind the migrant crisis (open question)	5	1
Rich financiers are behind the migrant crisis (open question)	4	4
<i>“To your knowledge, refugees arriving to Hungary are generally rather aggressive and demanding”</i>	79	52
<i>“There is a strong relation between migration and the escalation of terrorism”</i>	77	61
<i>“It is likely that Muslims will eventually constitute a majority in Europe”</i> (Values 3 and 4 on a 4-point scale: <i>“likely”</i> and <i>“very likely”</i>)	65	47

Anti-Semitic respondents have a poorer perception of migrants than others, 79 percent of them think migrants are aggressive and demanding, while “only” 52 percent of the not anti-Semitic respondents think the same. A higher percent of anti-Semites fear from terror attacks, Muslims and migrants and they are more prone to think that these are closely related to one another. According to the statistics, they are even more susceptible to conspiracy theories—anti-Semites are more susceptible to believe conspiracy theories in general, but when it came to mentioning George Soros and Israel, the difference between anti-Semitic and

not anti-Semitic respondents grew even further. First, there is a large overlap between anti-migrant and anti-Semitic respondents and secondly, when asked about the causes of the migrant wave, many point at Soros, the Jews and Israel (but of course, mentioning the USA and “wealthy financiers” does not rule out the association with Jewish influence either).

Nevertheless, when respondents are asked to choose between the Jews and the Muslims, the majority choose the former.

Table 11 *In your opinion, which religion is closer to traditional European values? (percent of respondents according to their party preferences and perceptions of the Jews, percentage)*

	<i>Jewish religion</i>	<i>Islam</i>	<i>Both are the same (either close or not close)</i>	<i>do not know</i>	<i>Total</i>
DK	54	9	30	7	100
LMP	48	12	32	8	100
small left-wing party	45	22	22	11	100
Fidesz	38	8	44	10	100
MSZP	36	7	44	13	100
Jobbik	31	10	45	14	100
no party named	30	6	48	16	100
not anti-Semitic	47	10	35	8	100
moderately anti-Semitic	25	16	47	12	100
extremely anti-Semitic	15	4	70	11	100
Total population	36	8	44	12	100

There are very few people in the Hungarian society who feel Islam is closer to European values. The question to the majority of Hungarians is whether Judaism is closer, or they are at the same distance (close or far) from European values. Left-wing supporters and those who are not anti-Semites feel more sympathy to Judaism, while Jobbik supporters and anti-Semitic respondents show the strongest antipathy towards the Jewish religion. Surprisingly, however, among Jobbik supporters, three times as

many respondents think that the Jewish religion is closer to European values than Islam. This is in contradiction with Jobbik’s orientation in foreign policy, which may be a manifestation of the cognitive dissonance caused by the migrant crisis. Although the proportion of extreme anti-Semites who chose Judaism is fairly low, they still think it is closer to European values than Islam.

8. Associations about the Jews

Respondents were asked to answer the open question “What comes to your mind first when you hear the word Jew?”. Similarly to previous methods, responses that were alike or meant

the same were classified in the same group. Approximately 20 percent of the respondents did not answer the question, this proportion is not shown in the table.

Table 12 What comes to your mind first when you hear the word “Jew”? (open question, spontaneous answers according to groups based on their perception of the Jews, percentage)

	not anti-Semitic	moderately anti-Semitic	extremely anti-Semitic	Jobbik supporters	total population
Neutral answer: religion, group of persons, customs, culture, the Bible, language	30	22	16	21	26
Persecution, the Holocaust, Auschwitz, World War II, suffering	27	23	14	26	23
External traits (sideburns, nose, etc.)	2	1	5	2	2
Relative, neighbor, acquaintance	3	0	0	0	2
Palestinian-Jewish conflict	3	5	4	1	4
Money, power, wealth, trade, the USA, influence	20	29	26	19	22
Negative characteristics: lust for power, greed, exploitation, meanness, laziness, hatred	6	18	30	23	13
They are the same as other people. I do not care who is Jewish and who is not... etc.	3	0	1	3	3
Foods (kosher, etc.)	2	0	2	2	2
Positive: they are smart, tolerant, hard-working, humane	4	2	2	3	3
	100	100	100	100	100

Answers of the top columns of the table are neutral and descriptive, we do not know whether they had emotional components. Mentions of “persecution”, “Auschwitz”, etc. (24 percent) also belong to this group, we do not know what the respondents think about the Holocaust. Some of the respondents (mainly not members of the anti-Semitic group) thought of their acquaintances. There were people who enlisted external traits, or brought up the Palestinian-Jewish conflict, but without sharing a particular standpoint about the matter. Thoughts of “money”, “power” and “influence” are dubious, they could be neutral, or even acknowledging,

but the majority of the group (22 percent of the respondents) were rather negative in their answers. Furthermore, jealousy and envy are some of the major motivations for anti-Semitism. The next group of respondents have negative attitudes, their associations were especially offending and degrading. Finally, the last three rows of Table 12 include thoughts that are presumably positive, the last row contains especially acknowledging and praising comments.

Similarly to associations about Israel, there is little correlation between anti-Semitism, party choice

and the thoughts the word “*Jew*” brought up. 8 percent of Jobbik supporters, and 5 percent of anti-Semites—approximately 9 percent of the total population—shared a positive thought. Many among them mentioned neutral words, and their proportion in the “*slightly negative*” money-wealth-influence group is the same as others’ (what’s more, the proportion of Jobbik supporters is the lowest). Only the group with especially negative comments have the expected pattern: 31 percent of anti-Semites and 23 percent of Jobbik supporters belong to this group. It appears once again that there are fewer respondents who express negative associations about only Jews than those who were classified as anti-Semitic based on their agreements with previously formulated statements. On the other hand, there were respondents from the not anti-Semitic group who gave negative or “*partially negative*” (“*money*”, etc.) answers. Including them, one-third of the respondents answered the

question negatively. So overall, there seems to be a difference between susceptibility to anti-Semitism and embedded anti-Semitism.

The next question was “*Do you have Jewish acquaintances?*”, to which 23 percent of the respondents answered yes. Although we have not indicated it in our report, we would like to highlight that having Jewish acquaintances significantly decrease the probability of anti-Semitic or anti-Israeli expressions. 82 percent of those with Jewish acquaintances belong to the not anti-Semitic group, while only 58 percent of the respondents without Jewish acquaintances are not anti-Semites. We also asked respondents with Jewish acquaintances how they knew they were Jewish. (Table 13 only includes 23 percent of the total respondents, those with Jewish acquaintances represent the 100 percent.)

Table 13 *How do you know that you have Jewish acquaintances? (open question, percentage of mentions)*

	<i>Total population</i>
They say it, they do not hide it	45
From their external traits, religion, customs	19
From acquaintances, family members, friends	11
Found out in a conversation, it is known, well-known, others said so	23
From their name	1
From their internal characteristics	1
Total	100

A majority of the respondents claim they did not find out that their acquaintances were Jewish, but they were told about it, it “*turned up*”, or it is “*well-known*”. Those who concluded it themselves relied on external traits. The statistical correlation is not significant, but a higher proportion of anti-Semites stated they concluded that some of their acquaintances were Jewish, based on their internal

or external characteristics, or their names. This is in line with the results of 2014 that a higher number of anti-Semites claim that Jews are recognizable. Last year’s and this year’s results are also similar in the aspect that the majority of respondents do not think their Jewish acquaintances are different from non-Jews, and it is mainly the anti-Semites who think the Jews are different.

Finally, the last open question was about “*typical*” answers that could not be assessed. Similar answers Jewish traits. 42 percent of the respondents gave were again classified in the same group.

Table 14 *What are typical Jewish traits? (open question, percentage of responses)*

	<i>not anti-Semitic</i>	<i>moderately anti-Semitic</i>	<i>extremely anti-Semitic</i>	<i>Jobbik supporters</i>	<i>total population</i>
There are no such things	26	8	2	12	18
Neutral: money, commercial instincts, trade, political instincts, sparing	15	16	15	18	15
Neutral: Facial traits (sideburns, big nose, ears, etc.), clothing, physique	20	27	40	24	25
Neutral: religious rules, customs	18	24	9	17	17
Positive: cohesive, educated, smart, helpful, talented, persistent, humorous	16	13	4	9	13
Negative: greedy, lust for power, oppress others, superior to others, selfish, envious, self-conceited, lazy, cunning, aggressive	5	12	30	20	12
	100	100	100	100	100

It is likely that 42 percent of the respondents refused to answer because they do not think there are typical Jewish traits, but 18 percent of the respondents did actually state that there are no such things (nearly all of them belong to the “*not anti-Semitic*” category). Most of the respondents mentioned neutral traits, mainly physical features. It is interesting that the majority of these traits are descriptive of an orthodox rabbi and not an average Jew. Again, a significant proportion of the respondents brought up money and the business instincts of the Jews—and we could not decide about the emotional components of these statements. Approximately the same number of people were negative and approving. Positive expressions were about intelligence and cohesion, the negatives included selfishness and contempt

for others. The results from 2014 were very similar, the basic difference is that we received a larger proportion of both positive and negative answers to this year’s open questions. Anti-Semitic orientation is also shown by the answers, but it is important to note that in both anti-Semitic and not anti-Semitic groups, respondents with neutral answers outnumber those with positive or negative responses. The answers of Jobbik supporters do not deviate much from this pattern of the total sample. Similar to previous questions, this too shows a moderate correlation between embedded anti-Semitism and anti-Semitism evoked by the multiple-choice questions of the questionnaire—a systematic difference is that those with anti-Semitic attitudes have more confidence in their ability to recognize Jews in sight.

9. The perception of anti-Semitism

What is anti-Semitism?

Respondents were asked what they think anti-Semitism is, who in contemporary Hungarian society they consider to be anti-Semitic, whether they had ever encountered anti-Semitism, and if

so, where? The aim was to get an insight into how respondents view the current state of anti-Semitism in Hungary.

Table 15 *What is anti-Semitism? "Is someone anti-Semitic in your opinion if he or she...? (percent)*

	<i>anti-Semitic</i>	<i>not anti-Semitic</i>	<i>do not know</i>
would limit the number of Jews in certain fields of employment	59	35	6
would not marry a Jew	56	36	8
do not consider Jews living in Hungary to be Hungarians	55	39	6
are of the opinion that Jews cannot become wholly Hungarian under any circumstances	54	39	7
say that by now it is evident that Jews are unable to fit into Hungarian society	51	44	7
think Jews are liable for communism in Hungary	43	49	8
believe that Jews are the enemies of the Christian faith	43	48	9
keep count of Jews in their lives	42	53	5
think that the interests of Hungarian Jews are significantly different from those of non-Jews	38	54	8
think that Jews have particular recognizable traits	38	56	6

The distribution of responses is mixed, which is not surprising in the light that there is no commonly accepted “*scientific*” answer to the question. Basically, there is no statement that everyone or no one considers anti-Semitic. Even people who promote anti-Semitism, who advocate that the Jews in Hungary are not Hungarians, and who would prohibit mixed relationships are regarded anti-Semites by only a small majority of the respondents. However, nearly 40 percent of the respondents have the opinion that it is anti-Semitic to believe that the Jews’ interests are different, that Jews are recognizable, or to keep count of Jews in one’s surroundings. It is apparent from these answers why there is no resolution of such debates

in the public discourse, as ordinary voters are not in consent either.

The polarized public opinion does not follow any clear-cut pattern. Respondents deemed as anti-Semitic based on their responses are equally divided regarding whether the statement they agreed with is anti-Semitic or not. One-fifth consider all statements as anti-Semitic. For example, half of the respondents who think the number of Jews should be restricted in certain fields of employment believe this is anti-Semitic thinking. (Table 16, numbers in bold). It would seem every other anti-Semite believes in the legitimacy of anti-Semitism. These results were very similar in 2014.

Table 16 *Those who think people in agreement with “The number of Jews should be restricted in certain fields of employment” are anti-Semites, based on whether they agreed with the statement themselves (percentage)*

<i>statement: The number of Jews should be restricted in certain fields of employment</i>						
Anti-Semitic: those would limit the number of Jews in certain fields of employment	1 not at all	2	3	4	5 completely	total sample
do not know	2	1	7	4	4	4
not anti-Semitic	17	38	55	46	48	36
anti-Semitic	81	61	38	50	48	60
total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Who are the anti-Semites?

Not only were respondents asked about but also which social groups they considered anti-what they consider to be anti-Semitism, Semitic and to what extent.

Table 17 *Who are the anti-Semites? Is anti-Semitism characteristic of the following groups? (percentage)*

<i>Characterized by strong anti-Semitism</i>	<i>2014</i>	<i>2015</i>
skinheads	69	65
supporters of Jobbik	37	37
right-wing media	14	11
the under-educated	10	10
supporters of Fidesz	6	3
young people	5	7
people from Budapest	2	4
priests	4	3
religious Christians	5	5
intellectuals	2	5
senior citizens	3	2
the poor	2	5
supporters of MSZP	1	2
left-wing media	1	2

Two-thirds of the respondents are of the opinion that strong anti-Semitism is a characteristic of skinheads, one-third mentioned the supporters of Jobbik. Compared to data from 2013 and 2014, it is interesting to note that despite Jobbik’s softening rhetoric, the party’s supporters were still thought to be as anti-Jewish in November 2015 as indicated one or two years ago. The efforts to be regarded

as a people’s party could somewhat change the composition of voters in the dimension of anti-Semitism, but it did not change the perception of the party itself, at least in this regard. Other groups in question were only considered “*characterized by some anti-Semitism*” by the majority of respondents, very few branded them strongly anti-Semitic.

The domains of anti-Semitism

Respondents were asked where they had ever encountered anti-Semitism.

Table 18 *Where have you come across anti-Semitism? (percent)*

	2014	2015
on radio or television	26	26
in the parliament, at political events	17	14
on the internet	21	20
on the streets, on public transport, in public spaces	15	9
among friends	10	11
at work	6	4
here in the house, in the neighborhood	3	4
in state institutions, by authorities	6	4

Table 18 show that an overwhelming majority of people—by their own admission—have not encountered anti-Semitism in their private life, only in public discourse. Respondents’ perceptions about the strength of modern anti-Semitism is

based largely on views relayed in the media and on the political stage rather than everyday experiences. No significant changes occurred in this dimension last year.

Presumable causes of anti-Semitism

We were also curious about what respondents would name as the causes of anti-Semitism.

Table 19 *Assumptions on the causes of anti-Semitism (percent, averages 1–5 scale; 5: has a very significant role, 1: has no role at all; answers of 5 and 4 are presented together)*

<i>Has a role + has a very significant role (values of 4 and 5)</i>	<i>2014</i>	<i>2015</i>
human stupidity	53	51
people are looking for a scapegoat to blame their difficulties on	45	46
the words of anti-Jewish politicians	40	49
many are envious of successful Jews	37	49
Israel's political behavior	33	37
economic crisis	37	44
Jews have too much influence in the country	24	32
Jews' behavior in general	22	21
too many Jews in the country	22	26
Jews are unable to fit into Hungarian society	18	20

The majority of society condemns anti-Semitism as they consider fallible human characteristics as its main causes. However, approximately one-fifth to one quarter of the respondents blame the Jews for the spread of anti-Semitism. It is also apparent that

the main “*sin*” is their “*too much influence*”, as this was mentioned the most. Opinions differ as to the extent that Israeli politics or anti-Jewish politicians’ statements have contributed to the spread of anti-Semitism.

10. Topical issues

In the last part of our questionnaire, respondents were asked about some public matters of 2015. First, we wanted to find out about the respondents' attitudes towards the German Occupation Memorial on Szabadság Square.

Table 20 *Awareness and opinions about the German Occupation Memorial on Szabadság Square (percent)*

		2014	2015
Awareness	Have you heard that the government erected a monument in Budapest to the victims of the German Occupation?	61	56
	To your knowledge, is the Jewish community in agreement with this?	22	21
Proportion of those in agreement	total population	33	42
	Fidesz supporters	43	50
	left-wing supporters	20	28
	Jobbik supporters	34	44
	no party preferences	32	41
	extremely anti-Semitic	23	39
	moderately anti-Semitic	43	50
	not anti-Semitic	34	47

Table 20 indicates that the issue of the German Occupation Memorial became less topical in 2015: the number of people who have—according to their own admission—heard about the erection of the memorial lowered by 5 percentage points, compared to 2014. It is even more revealing that a mere 2 percent of the respondents mentioned the issue without a prompt, while 10 percent did so last year. One-fifth of the respondents still hold the mistaken belief that the Jewish community supported the erection of the memorial.

Public opinion is still divided on the issue, but the number of people who approve of the monument has significantly increased by 9 percentage points. This increase is evenly distributed among voters of the different political parties and anti-Semitism groups, the approval of the monument grew by approximately 10 percent in all the different groups. Similar to last year's results, pro-government voters, moderately anti-

Semites and not anti-Semites are the ones who approve of the memorial by the largest margin, while left-wing supporters and extreme anti-Semites are clear critics and opponents of it. Left-wing supporters are likely to think that the memorial symbolizes the sole responsibility of the Germans for the Holocaust, and therefore is a falsification of history. Strong anti-Semites are probably against it because they are frustrated by any memorial that is against the Nazis.

In 2015, the most covered Jewish-related issue was the introduction of an obligatory course on the Holocaust at the Pázmány Péter Catholic University (PPKE). As presented in Chapter 2, however, the news did not reach a broad audience. 2 percent of the respondents could recall the information, and although 16 percent claimed they had heard about the course, only 9 percent of them knew it was a course at PPKE.

Table 21 *Awareness and opinions about the obligatory course on the Holocaust at PPKE (percentage)*

	<i>Heard about it</i>	<i>Agree with it</i>
total population	16	42
Jobbik	20	18
no party preferences	11	36
Fidesz	15	43
MSZP	24	58
DK and other small left-wing parties	25	64
LMP	29	71
extreme anti-Semites	22	19
moderately anti-Semites	17	48
not anti-Semites	16	52

The news reached left-wing supporters, and extreme anti-Semites or Jobbik supporters by the largest margin. However, taking into account that the issue (and especially the fact that the rector of the university held a press conference together with Israel's Ambassador to Hungary, Ilan Mor) caused a storm in far-right circles, the ratio of their awareness is not considered high either. The polarized public opinion follows an expected pattern. Less than one-fifth of Jobbik supporters and extreme anti-Semites approve of the initiative, while the majority of not

anti-Semites and left-wing supporters do. The ratio of MSZP supporters is closer to the average value than supporters of DK and other left-wing parties (Együtt, PM, Munkáspárt, MOMA, Liberálisok). An even higher proportion of LMP supporters stand by the course, but because of their small number, there is a statistical uncertainty in this context. Overall, Hungarians are divided on the issue, but a slightly higher number of people are against the course than for it.

11. Comparison

At the end of our analysis, we turn to the question of how strong the explanations for anti-Semitism offered by the discussed approaches are relative to each other. We examine what the hierarchical relationship is between the separately presented correlations (i.e., which can be considered the strongest, and which are only loosely related to anti-Semitism). In statistical analyses, this is generally shown by the so-called logistic regression model, incorporating a large number of variables (questions, statements) at the same time. The analyses have one result variable: the question to be explained. In our case, this result variable is an already used comprehensive indicator of anti-Semitism: the highly and moderately anti-Semitic groups were merged, so it contained everyone characterized by a significant degree of anti-Jewish opinions. Based on the different variables in the survey questions, the model examines the ability to predict a person's susceptibility to anti-Semitic beliefs (Table 22). The index measuring the strength of relationship is 1 in the hypothetical case where the result variable can be explained by the very model fully, that is, it can be fully inferred from the explanatory factors that someone is anti-Semitic or not. The index's minimum is 0. In that case, the variables in the model are completely independent from anti-Semitism. The explanatory factors in the first model—almost all questions and statements in the questionnaire, a full list is set out in the Appendix—together have a 65.5 percent probability of being able to predict anti-Semitic attitudes (this is very high in political sociology). This leaves 34.5 percent, whose anti-Semitism depends on factors outside of the framework of our research.

This comprehensive model was next deconstructed to find out how strong explanations (predictions) were presented in each chapter. There are only socio-demographic background variables in the second model, and only political self-placement and party preferences are variables in the third. The fourth model contains the variables associated with xenophobia, the fifth model's variables are adherence to order, nationalism, Euro-skepticism, the rejection of the "*transgression of norms*", and political pessimism. The sixth has the perception of current events, the seventh has the negative responses given to open questions and finally the variable of the eighth model is having Jewish acquaintances. The Appendix contains all questions and statements used in our analysis.

The demographic model plays no significant role, which means that social groups alone do not have a significant correlation with the susceptibility of anti-Semitism. The perception of current events and Jewish acquaintances variables have a small yet significant influence on anti-Semitism. Those who have Jewish acquaintances, who are against the German Occupation Memorial on Szabadság Square, and who support compulsory education on the Holocaust are less likely to feel antipathy towards the Jews. In comparison, the models based on open questions have stronger influences. Respondents who have negative associations about Israel and the Jews, and who mention negative traits when asked about the Jews are more likely to be anti-Semitic. However, this latter model has only an 11 percent probability of being able to predict anti-Semitic attitudes so it reinforces our claim presented in Chapter 8 that there is only a moderate correlation

between agreeing (“connecting”) to anti-Semitic statements and embedded anti-Semitism. Political issues have moderate effects as well. Predictions of anti-Semitism can be made with approximately 13 percent probability based on political beliefs and party preference.

Table 22 Comparison of the explanatory power of the different models

<i>model</i>	<i>strength of correlation</i> ¹²
1. full	0,655
2. demographics (age, gender, type of settlement, financial status, religion)	0 (not significant)
3. party preference and political self-placement (scales of left-right, conservative-liberal, moderate-radical)	0,134
4. xenophobia	0,427
5. other political issues (adherence to order, nationalism, euro-skepticism, ‘norm violation’, rejection of otherness, pessimism) ¹³	0,308
6. opinion on current issues (German Occupation Memorial, compulsory course on the Holocaust at PPKE)	0,095
7. open questions, negative associations about the Jews	0,110
8. having Jewish acquaintances	0,071

Similar to results from 2014, we found that merely xenophobia and social attitudes are strong explanatory factors. Our research also confirms that prejudice is rarely directed toward one group and xenophobia often takes form in anti-Semitism, too. Authoritarianism, prosecution of those who transgress traditional norms, adherence to order, and nationalism lead to a political character structure which makes citizens more susceptible to anti-Semitism. Overall, the rejection of those who

are “different” (let it be immigrants, homosexuals, drug addicts, and other ethnic groups or minorities) increases the likelihood of anti-Semitism more than other characteristics. However, the statistical data analysis also underscores that agreement or disagreement with anti-Jewish statements depends significantly on factors outside our research. We are unable to always predict anti-Semitism with a questionnaire.

12 Nagelkerke’s R Square Index. The index’s maximum is 1, in that case the result variable (anti-Semitism for us) can be explained by the model’s explanatory factors fully. The index is 0 if the variables in the model are completely independent from the result variable. For statistical reasons, all explanatory factors are dichotomous variables: they can only take two values (capital or country, young or old, graduate or not, etc.) Every model is significant at a 95 percent confidence level.

13 The model includes the following questions:

- Adherence to order: “Would you sentence drug abusers to severe imprisonment?”; “Would you support death penalty?”;
- Nationalism: “Firmer actions are needed to advocate the interest of Hungarian minorities in neighboring countries”; “The protection of national values is more important than EU membership”; “People with strong nationalist sentiments should have a decisive say in important matters”;
- “Norm violation”, rejection of otherness: “Do you consider homosexuality immoral?”; “Would you constrict abortion?”
- Political pessimism: “In this country, one can become rich only through dishonest means”; “People, if they wish, have the opportunity to influence the country’s future”; “Despite often making mistakes, politicians seek to serve the interest of people”; “Nowadays, people often do not get justice even from the courts”; “Not many people can have faith in the future”; “Everything and everybody can be bought today”

12. Summary

The primary focus of our research was to find out how much Hungarian society is concerned with Jewish issues. The high percent of “*Do not know*” responses and the frequency of inconsistent answers suggest that a majority of the respondents were not able to form an opinion on the subject, they could not relate to the questions regarding Jews. Only 10 percent of the respondents could recall a Jewish related public event from 2015. On the other hand, this percent is not necessarily low considering that the majority of Hungarian society pays attention to other ethnic groups and minorities to a much lower extent.

Secondly, before presenting the data of our research, it is important to think over what agreements with the statements of the questionnaire mean, and what they do not mean. They do express opinions and attitudes, but not behavior and discrimination. We are unable to know how serious these opinions are, responses with extreme values do not necessarily reflect extreme views or serious passion. One important lesson learned was that there is a difference between anti-Semitism expressed by spontaneous comments and anti-Semitism based on agreement with certain statements. A majority of the respondents who were considered anti-Semitic based on the traditional method of checking their agreement with certain statements, did not have negative associations with Israel and the Jews, yet when they were told anti-Semitic and anti-Israel statements, they were more prone to agree or “*connect*” to them. This correlation may exist the other way as well, those who disagree with anti-Semitic statements may have their own anti-Semitic thoughts. Based on this, it seems clear that anti-Semitism is more of a susceptibility than a constant state of mind. In our reading, volatility is a natural characteristic of anti-Semitism.

Bearing that interpretation in mind, it is informative to ask the same questions year after year because that makes outlining long-term tendencies possible. The research data are related to the popularity of beliefs and misconceptions concerning the Jews (cognitive anti-Semitism), and the emotional relationship with and social distance from the Jews (affective anti-Semitism). Based on this, anti-Semitism strengthened considerably in 2010 (we believe that it was not independent from Jobbik’s rise to a mainstream political power), and remained at the same level with only very small changes until 2014. Since last year, agreement with anti-Semitic statements has slightly increased.

The society’s affective anti-Semitism is primarily the manifestation of general xenophobia. Respondents with negative views of other ethnic groups are also more likely to have negative views of Jews. One might think, for example, that someone who does not accept Jews as neighbors would have a more positive view of skinheads. On the contrary, respondents with anti-Semitic views are more likely to hold negative views of skinheads, too. Anti-Semitism does have specific features, but it should be noted that, for a large part of the Hungarian population, being Jewish is only one case of a people being different and therefore invokes antipathy.

The ratio of feeling antipathy towards the Jews is not high compared to the antipathy towards other ethnic groups. Migrants, who now have an even poorer perception than the Gypsies, are the most disapproved group. The appearance of migrants (and the change in perception of the Arabs and the Africans, who are associated with migrants) had an influence on the perception of Jews. Improvements in the perception of Jews only occurred in contexts where respondents valued the Jews in comparison with the migrants.

One of the key questions of our research was “*Which social groups are more susceptible to anti-Semitism and what are the underlying motivations?*”. Our analysis suggests that social group affiliation and anti-Semitism are almost completely independent from one another. There is no clear correlation between income or education level, employment type, age, religion, and the prevalence of anti-Semitism. Individuals who support Jobbik and consider themselves more radical than moderate are more likely to have anti-Semitic views, but these characteristics only explain anti-Semitism partially. The likelihood of anti-Semitic views is also proportional to nationalist, Euro-skeptic, over-adhering, authoritarian social attitudes, and the rejection of various forms of being different (homosexuality, drug abuse, immigration). Pessimistic views of humankind are not related to anti-Semitism. These questions regarding attitudes, and together with xenophobia, are the strongest predictors of anti-Semitism.

Remembrance of the Holocaust in Hungary divides the society deeply. Half of the respondents believe the Holocaust is an important topic for public discourse, while the other half would completely neglect the issue. With regards to this question, there has been no shift in temporal trend, but the support of open denial or relativization of the Holocaust rose from 7–14 percent in 2006 to 11–23 percent in 2015.

Regarding questions on the perception of Israel, we have found that it is difficult for the respondents to relate to this issue. Correlation between anti-Semitic prejudice and the perception of Israel has only been found in simpler statements.

Most of the respondents felt ambiguous about the links between Israel, Jews and migration.

Hungarian public opinion has become a bit more understanding with Israel's fights against Arab countries, as migration waves have probably turned people's antipathy towards the Arab countries. First, it was surprising that extreme anti-Semites were the most understanding towards the Jewish state. Yet they felt the most antipathy towards migrants and the Arabs in general, so there is a clear link between their perceptions of the two groups. Furthermore, it is important to note that anti-migrant views could only lessen antipathy towards the Jews and Israel temporarily and in certain contexts, other times these are closely related. When asked about the causes of the migrant waves, many blamed George Soros, Jews, or Israel. According to the majority of the respondents, Jews are closer to European values than Muslims. It is remarkable that even Jobbik supporters think so, as opposed to the party's orientation in foreign policy.

Although the anti-Semitism of Jobbik supporters have slightly decreased, the aim to become a people's party has not been successful in changing public perception. The ratio of respondents who find Jobbik and its supporters anti-Semitic has not changed. There has been no change in the perception of anti-Semitism either. Voters are divided on the question of what anti-Semitism is, but this is not surprising in the light that there is no scientific-academic consensus either. There is no statement that everyone or no one considers anti-Jewish. What is more, respondents deemed as anti-Semitic are equally divided regarding whether the statement they agreed with is anti-Semitic.

Based on their answers to the question “*What comes to your mind when you hear the word Jew?*”, respondents could be equally divided into three groups: those who gave descriptive, neutral answers (religion, people, country), respondents who

thought of the Holocaust and persecutions, and those who brought up money, influence, and power. We were unable to determine whether individuals who belong to the latter group were driven by approval or jealousy, yet envy and jealousy are often major motivations for anti-Semitism. When respondents were asked to enlist typical Jewish traits, among *“business instincts”*, the majority

of respondents mentioned external traits and religious customs. Explicitly positive or negative internal characteristics were hardly mentioned: approximately 10 percent said Jews are *“educated”*, *“cohesive”*, *“smart”*, while another 10 percent said they are *“greedy”*, they have a *“lust for power”*, and they *“disregard others”*.

Appendix

The full logistic regression model

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Model</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>Standard error</i>	<i>Level of significance</i>	<i>Exponential Beta (Odds ratio)</i>
Negative associations about the Jews	7	1,077	0,361	0,003	2,935
Negative associations about Israel	7	0,683	0,788	0,386	1,98
Enlist negative traits as typical of the Jews	7	1,669	0,477	0,000	5,305
Have Jewish acquaintances	8	-0,75	0,335	0,025	0,472
Live in a small town	1	0,932	0,376	0,013	2,54
Gender	1	0,175	0,452	0,567	1,192
University / college graduate	1	0,121	0,35	0,730	1,128
Group of people with low income	1	-0,14	0,349	0,699	0,874
Group of people with higher income	1	-0,31	0,304	0,302	0,731
Do not go to church regularly	1	0,133	0,267	0,617	1,142
Jobbik voter	3	0,116	0,413	0,778	1,123
Left-wing voter	3	-0,56	0,43	0,196	0,574
Aged under 40	1	0,032	0,266	0,906	1,032
Only primary level of education	1	-0,6	0,316	0,057	0,549
Interested or very interested in politics	3	-0,43	0,257	0,094	0,65
On the scale of left-right, right-wing (at least 5 on a scale of 7)	3	0,287	0,284	0,311	1,333
Conservative (at least 5 on a scale of 7)	3	0,127	0,255	0,619	1,135
Radical (at least 5 on a scale of 7)	3	1,163	0,327	0,000	3,199
Would consent to an Arab neighbor	4	-0,02	0,472	0,963	0,978
Would consent to an American neighbor	4	-0,88	0,304	0,004	0,416
Would consent to a Gypsy neighbor	4	-0,37	0,419	0,384	0,694
Would consent to a Chinese neighbor	4	-0,96	0,337	0,005	0,385
Would consent to a homosexual neighbor	4	0,255	0,345	0,460	1,29
Would consent to a Transylvanian Hungarian neighbor	4	-0,19	0,329	0,575	0,831
Would consent to a skinhead neighbor	4	0,573	0,37	0,121	1,774
Would consent to an African neighbor	4	0,601	0,399	0,132	1,824
Would consent to a Romanian neighbor	4	0,8	0,336	0,017	2,225
Would consent to a Swabian neighbor	4	-0,73	0,374	0,053	0,484
Would consent to a migrant as a neighbor	4	-1,06	0,545	0,053	0,348
Sympathy towards the Arabs	4	-0,06	0,092	0,525	0,943
Sympathy towards the Gypsies	4	0,028	0,087	0,746	1,029
Sympathy towards the Chinese	4	0,317	0,1	0,002	1,373
Sympathy towards the Africans	4	-0,36	0,104	0,001	0,699
Sympathy towards the Romanians	4	-0,03	0,086	0,726	0,97
Sympathy towards the Swabians	4	-0,35	0,11	0,001	0,704
Sympathy towards the Slovaks	4	-0,14	0,107	0,204	0,873
Sympathy towards refugees and migrants	4	-0,03	0,097	0,735	0,968

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Model</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>Standard error</i>	<i>Level of significance</i>	<i>Exponential Beta (Odds ratio)</i>
Would constrict abortion	5	1,141	0,263	0,000	3,13
Would tighten refugee admission	5	-0,85	0,391	0,129	0,426
Have religious beliefs	5	0,113	0,257	0,659	1,12
Support death penalty	5	-0,05	0,286	0,867	0,953
Consider homosexuality immoral	5	1,117	0,278	0,000	3,056
Would penalize drug abuse with severe sentence of imprisonment	5	0,16	0,282	0,570	1,173
Would limit the number of non-whites living in the country	5	1,673	0,336	0,000	5,328
Despite often making mistakes, politicians seek to serve the interest of people	5	0,349	0,298	0,241	1,417
In this country, one can become rich only through dishonest means	5	-0,12	0,307	0,698	0,888
Firmer actions are needed to advocate the interest of Hungarian minorities in neighboring countries	5	-0,21	0,259	0,418	0,811
People, if they wish, have the opportunity to influence the country's future	5	0,166	0,26	0,523	1,181
Nowadays people often do not get justice even from the courts	5	0,641	0,272	0,018	1,898
Protection of our natural values is more important than EU membership	5	0,243	0,283	0,391	1,275
Not many people can have faith in the future	5	0,212	0,291	0,467	1,236
People with strong nationalist sentiments should have a decisive say in important matters	5	-0,42	0,273	0,123	0,656
The country's leaders do not really care about people like you	5	-0,18	0,271	0,498	0,832
Religious education should be compulsory in schools	5	0,353	0,28	0,208	1,423
Everything and everybody can be bought today	5	-0,26	0,309	0,406	0,773
It is a moral duty even today to openly take a stand against the Treaty of Trianon	5	0,339	0,294	0,249	1,404
Approve of the German Occupation Memorial	6	-0,405	0,32	0,202	0,667
Support PPKE's Holocaust education	6	-0,176	0,34	0,603	0,838
Constant		-0,43	1,629	0,791	0,649

Note: dependent/outcome variable: a comprehensive anti-Semitism indicator (cognitive and affective anti-Semitism, see Graph 5). 95 percent significant variables in bold. The number in the model column indicates which sub-model the variable belong to. (2 = demographic; 3 = party preference and self-placement; 4 = xenophobia against other ethnic groups; 5 = adherence to order, nationalism, authoritarianism, rejection of transgression of norms; 6 = assessment of current events). The odd ratio expresses to what extent the likelihood of anti-Semitism is increased by the explanatory variable. For example, if an individual wants to restrict the number of non-whites living in the country—with all other conditions remaining the same—on average, he or she is 5.328 times more likely to belong to the anti-Semitic groups than someone who would not want to do so. However, a person who would accept American neighbors, is only 0.416 times more likely to be among the anti-Semites, i. e. it is more probable that he or she does not belong to the anti-Semitic group. According to multivariate analysis, those who agree with the limit on non-white people, and who think of negative traits when asked about the Jews are the more likely to become members of the anti-Semitic group.

Action and Protection Foundation

Address: Semmelweis utca 19, 1052 Budapest

HUNGARY

Phone: +36 1 267 57 54

+36 30 207 5130

<http://www.tev.hu>

info@tev.hu